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   nnovation Research IAbstract 
Many countries are currently considering bans on incandescent light bulbs and 
other policies to enhance the residential diffusion of energy-saving compact flu-
orescent lamps (CFLs). However the reasons for currently limited diffusion of 
CFLs are largely unknown. This paper employs a Double Hurdle model to iden-
tify distinct barriers to household consideration of CFLs and the subsequent 
intensity of adoption using a large survey of German households. The results 
reveal that barriers to CFL consideration are low for all, except households with 
very low incomes. Further, barriers to CFL consideration are strongly linked to 
the characteristics of the residences of low-income households. Thus, the grea-
test potential for increasing the diffusion of CFLs lies not in addressing barriers 
to consideration, but in augmenting the intensity of household adoption particu-
larly within high income groups.  
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1 Introduction 
Improving energy efficiency is a core strategy for a sustainable energy system. 
In the residential sector, energy-saving technologies can spur cost savings for 
private households, while reducing greenhouse gas emissions and other pollut-
ants and increasing the security of energy supplies. Two policy pathways exist 
to accelerate residential energy-efficiency gains. First, research investments 
and other policy interventions can be designed to accelerate the generation of 
new energy-saving innovations. Second, policies can be designed to promote 
the diffusion of existing residential energy-saving innovations. For example, 
residential energy efficiency in the European Union expanded group of 25 
member states (EU 25) is estimated to have improved 10 percent since 1990 
(ENERDATA 2007). However, the 2007 European Council Action Plan for En-
ergy Efficiency (European Commission 2006) states that the residential build-
ings sector exhibits the potential for further cost-effective energy-savings of 27 
percent by 2020 using existing technologies. Thus, enhanced diffusion of ‘off-
the-shelf’’ technologies are expected to play a substantial role in medium-term 
residential energy savings and attendant greenhouse gas reductions.  
Energy-efficient compact fluorescent lamps (CFLs) are an off-the-shelf technol-
ogy with a particularly high potential to generate residential energy-savings. 
There are an estimated 33 billion light bulbs worldwide that consume 2,600 
TWh per year or 19 percent of global electricity use, with 30 percent of this con-
sumption by the residential sector (Zissis et al. 2007). However, energy efficient 
CFLs represent only 4 percent of the global market and 6 percent of the Euro-
pean market. Fluorescent lamp adoption is also considerably lower in the resi-
dential sector than in the service sector, despite significant publicly supported 
efforts to increase diffusion (Menanteau and Lefebvre 2000). Atanasiu et al. 
(2007) estimate that cost-effective savings of at least 11.7 TWh per year (1.5 
percent) in residential electricity consumption still exist in the EU 25 from in-
creased adoption of CFLs, with potential savings of up to 21.9 TWh per year 
with aggressive policies to increase diffusion.  
A considerable body of research exists on the technical merits of CFLs. How-
ever, as with residential energy-saving technologies in general, empirical analy-
sis of the relationship between socioeconomic factors and diffusion has been 2  Why Don’t Households See the Light?  
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limited.1 An early study of CFL adoption by Scott (1997) for Ireland finds very 
low levels of household use and few relationships with household socio-
demography characteristics. Kumar et al. (2003) also find limited adoption in 
India, but increased probability of household adoption with higher education and 
income levels. We know of no recent studies that empirically examine the fac-
tors driving CFL diffusion, particularly for Northern European countries which 
have some of the highest rates of household adoption in the world (Menanteau 
and Lefebvre, 2000). However, understanding the relationship between socio-
demographic characteristics and adoption is particularly timely in EU countries. 
At the Spring 2007 summit EU leaders urged the European Commission to rap-
idly submit proposals to increase the efficiency of residential lighting by 2009, 
including potentially banning the sale of incandescent bulbs (Council of the Eu-
ropean Union 2007).2 Such policies stand to differentially impact households 
based on current adoption levels. However, the distributional impacts of policies 
to aggressively promote residential use of CFLs are unclear without a solid un-
derstanding of the relationship between socio-demographic factors and house-
hold use of CFLs. 
This paper empirically identifies the socio-demographic and other factors asso-
ciated with the residential diffusion of energy-saving CFLs in Germany using a 
large household survey. As CFLs are a highly divisible innovation, a Double-
Hurdle model is employed that specifies adoption as a two-part decision. In part 
one, the household decides whether to actively explore purchasing CFLs (enter 
the market). Then, in part two, the household determines the intensity of adop-
tion. The statistical model and its empirical specification are presented in the 
next section. Data and descriptive statistics on residential CFL usage in Ger-
many and on the variables employed to explain differential household market 
entry and adoption intensity are presented in Section 3. Model estimation re-
sults are presented in Section 4. The paper then concludes with an examination 
of the potential impact of policies to further increase diffusion.  
                                            
1   Previous studies of factors associated with other residential energy-saving innovations include 
attic and wall insulation and window glazing in the U.K (Brechling and Smith 1994) attic insula-
tion and water heater insulation in Ireland (Scott, 1997), and energy efficient appliances and 
heating systems in Germany (Schlomann et al. 2004; Schlomann et al. 2005).  
2  Australia and the United States have already passed similar legislation. Why Don’t Households See the Light? 
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2  Conceptual Framework, Statistical Model, and  
Empirical Specification 
CFL adoption is viewed as a utility maximizing decision by the household within 
the constraints of uncertain and costly information. The observed use of CFLs is 
assumed to stem from the following ’Double-Hurdle’ decision-making process. 
In part one the household decides whether to enter the market for CFLs, which 
entails acquiring costly information on the technology. Rogers (2003) calls this 
stage-one decision the ‘awareness stage’ in the adoption process, while in the 
marketing literature this stage-one decision is referred to as the ‘consideration 
set’ (Manski 1977). The decision to enter the market is based on a comparison 
of the utility associated with CFL market entry based on expected electricity 
cost-savings and costs of obtaining information on the new alternative 
0
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and the utility associated with the current incandescent bulb technology  ; 
where z(b) is the expected net cost-savings from replacement of b incandescent 
lamps with CFLs, b is the choice of number of CFL bulbs, y is income, and c is 
the costs of acquiring information on CFL availability and performance. Denote 
b* as the number of bulbs that maximizes household expected utility with mar-
ket entry. Given that z(b*) is uncertain and the utility function is increasing and 
concave,  
    
must be greater than c for market entry to occur, with the magnitude of the dif-
ference representing the cost of uncertainty to the household. 
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Household characteristics influence CFL market entry by determining costs of 
investment in information. Household characteristics may also be associated 
with non-monetary utility gains from CFLs use compared to the use of incan-
descent bulbs. Further, constraints on time, attention, or cognitive ability to 
process information may result in satisficing behaviour and the use of routines 
or rules of thumb in the market entry decision outside of the strict utility maxi-
mizing framework (Simon 1959). Such bounded rationality can generate barri-
ers to market entry for energy efficient technologies – even with complete and 
certain information. Psychological  considerations such as personal values, 
commitment and motivation, membership in social groups, and status consid-4  Why Don’t Households See the Light?  
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erations may also play key roles in consumer decisions about energy efficiency 
investments (Stern, 1986; Stern and Aronson 1984).  
If the household overcomes these barriers and enters the market, the house-
hold’s second decision is the intensity of purchase of CFLs for home use. In the 
simplest case the cost-savings with CFLs, z(b), are now fully known, so the 
household decision on the intensity of adoption is simply expressed as 
[ ] (( ) (
b ) Ma x Uy z b Uy +−  
and the adoption intensity decision is based on the criteria of positive net cost-
savings at the margin with censoring at zero (DeSarbo and Choi 1999).3  
Assuming that cost-savings per-CFL decline across potential household appli-
cations, factors that increase cost-savings for all bulbs will also increase the 
intensity of CFL adoption. In figure 1 increased cost-savings are represented as 
an outward shift of the demand curve from I
0 to I
1 that increases the number of 
CFLs used by the household from A
0 to A’. Note, that such a shift, if incorpo-
rated into the market entry decision, also increases expected consumer surplus 
and, thus, raises the probability of market entry. Household characteristics as 
proxies for preferences will also influence adoption intensity if they shift the util-
ity associated with non-monetary benefits and costs for the marginal CFL appli-
cation. 
                                            
3  Alternatively market entry information investments in the first stage could reduce but not 
eliminate uncertainty about cost savings, leaving the household to choose the optimal adop-
tion intensity with some remaining uncertainty in a dynamic model of adoption (e.g. Tsur, 
Sternberg, and Hochman 1990). Why Don’t Households See the Light? 
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Figure 1:  CFL demand 
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The market entry decision is empirically specified in the discrete choice random 
utility framework as: 
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where  is a latent variable for entry into the CFL market by household i, 
1
*
i y 1i X is 
a vector of proxies for cost-savings and preferences that determine market en-
try,   is the associated vector of parameter estimates, and   is an error term 
which in assumed N.I.I.D.(0,1). The market entry decision is then represented 
as 
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The adoption intensity decision is measured as the share of household bulbs 
which are CFLs and is also a latent variable since the distribution of adoption 6  Why Don’t Households See the Light?  
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intensity is censored at a lower bound of zero.4   
Specifically, 
*'
22 2 ii yX B u =+ 2 i   
where   is a latent variable for intensity of adoption, 
*
2i y 2i X  is a vector of deter-
minants of adoption intensity, and   is error terms which is assumed 
N.I.I.D.(0,
2i u
σ ). The observed adoption intensity,  , has the following relation-





 if   0 and  0









Observed positive adoption arises from both market entry and having a strictly 
positive latent adoption intensity.  
The associated likelihood function for estimation, assuming independence of 
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where  i I is an indicator for observed adoption. The model can also allow for cor-
relation between the error terms u1 and u2. However, this correlation is often 
difficult to estimate with precision (Smith, 2002). 
Model specification 
The expected impacts of explanatory variables on the market entry and the in-
tensity of adoption decisions are outlined below.  
CFL bulbs can generate cost-savings for the household in two ways. First, CFL 
bulbs are more energy efficient than incandescent bulbs. For equivalent lighting, 
CFLs use between one-fifth and one-quarter of the power of equivalent incan-
descent lamps (General Electric, undated; Waide 2006). This results in consid-
erable savings on electricity expenditures. The second avenue for expenditure 
reductions is through longer bulb-life. Currently, CFLs have a life span of be-
tween 6,000 and 15,000 hours and last six to twenty times longer than incan-
                                            
4  Censoring is also possible at the upper bound of 1 if CFL use in all household sockets is 
prevalent. Why Don’t Households See the Light? 
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descent bulbs. These benefits come, however, at a much higher bulb price. 
Currently, the market price for CFLs is three to ten times higher than for equiva-
lent incandescent bulbs. 
Engineering data suggest that in most cases expenditure reductions signifi-
cantly outweigh higher initial bulb prices, with total cost-savings estimated at 
Euro 80 over the CFL life for a 20 watt CFL compared to a lighting equivalent 
100 watt incandescent bulb, assuming 3 hours continuous burning per day and 
an electrical price of 0.15 Euro/kWh (European Lighting Commission Federation 
2007). However, household use patterns will influence the magnitude actual 
cost-savings. Given the relatively high initial cost, CFL bulbs are not profitable 
investments in very low use areas, e.g. cellars. Further, until recently CFL life 
decreased substantially with rapid on/off cycles. For example, in 2002 with an 
average 5 minute on/off cycle CFL life was equivalent to that of an incadescent 
bulb.5 Thus, at the time of the 2002 survey data used in this paper cost-savings 
were considerably lower in areas requiring lighting for only brief periods, e.g. 
garages. These CFL bulb limitations support the assumption of decreasing 
marginal profitability of CFLs in household sockets indicated in figure 1 when 
total lighting needs are held constant. Consequently, 100 percent adoption of 
CFLs in all household sockets may be observed only rarely based strictly on the 
cost-savings criterion.  
Declining marginal cost-savings of CFLs in residential applications and few 
households with 100 percent adoption, if empirically supported, have important 
implications for identification restrictions in the empirical model. Specifically, the 
number of sockets that support profitable CFL investments will be fixed per 
household after controlling for other factors that affect lighting usage like family 
and residence size. The intensity of adoption, as measured by the ratio of CFL 
bulbs to total bulbs is, therefore, expected to decline with the total number of 
bulbs in the household, ceteris paribus, if 100 per cent adoption is not profitable. 
In the empirical specification linear and quadratic terms for total number of 
bulbs are included to allow the impact to vary across total number of bulbs. The 
market entry decision should be, by contrast, unaffected by the total number of 
bulbs in the household. Expected aggregate cost-savings will differ little with 
additional sockets in the residence after controlling for lighting needs, because 
(if CFLs are not currently used in all sockets) the household would not expect to 
adopt CFLs in the additional sockets. By the same token, the size of the resi-
                                            
5   This deficiency has been addressed in more recent CFLs (ELC Federation 2007). 8  Why Don’t Households See the Light?  
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dence, as measured by meters squared of floor space, is positively associated 
with greater lighting needs. Floor space should, therefore, be positively associ-
ated with adoption intensity, given higher lighting needs per bulb after control-
ling for the total number of bulbs in the household. However, in this case greater 
total lighting needs will increase expected aggregate cost-savings and, thus, 
also increase incentives for market entry. In the empirical specification, linear 
and quadratic terms for floor space are included in both the market entry and 
adoption intensity equations.  
Renting rather than owning the residence has been established as an important 
barrier to the adoption of residential energy-saving technologies, as it is often 
difficult to apportion energy-efficiency technology investments and savings be-
tween tenants and landlords (Jaffe and Stavins 1994; Sutherland 1996). The 
age of the residence may also influence adoption intensity, as it was initially 
more difficult to find CFLs that fit some older lighting fixtures (Menateau and 
Lefebrve 2000). If this constraint is found to be important, it would suggest that 
the diffusion of CFLs may be limited by the relatively slow renewal of housing 
stock. Therefore, an indicator for residences built prior to 1951 is included in 
both the market entry and adoption intensity specifications. Other attributes of 
the residence may also influence adoption decisions. For instance, living in a 
detached household may be associated with differential lighting needs, as well 
as lower costs of information on available residential energy-saving technolo-
gies due to greater involvement in home maintenance. 
Household member characteristics may influence household lighting needs. For 
example, retirees are likely to spend more time at home, which will increase 
lighting needs. Retirees also spend more time shopping (Aguiar and Hurst 
2007), which suggests that they are more willing to invest in information CFL 
bulbs. Households with more members will, ceteris paribus, have greater light-
ing needs. As mentioned, characteristics of household members may also influ-
ence the market entry decision through associations with the costs of acquiring 
information on CFLs. Elderly individuals may have higher costs to information 
acquisition particularly if the Internet is a major source, which will raise barriers 
to market entry. Linear and quadratic terms for age of the main income earner 
in the household are included in both the market entry and adoption intensity 
equations. In contrast, higher education should reduce the costs associated 
with information acquisition (Schultz 1979). Benefits of CFL use accrue over 
several years, but purchase costs occur up front. Education, as a long term in-
vestment, may be correlated with a low household discount rate and, thus, be 
positively associated with the intensity of adoption. Unfortunately, the survey Why Don’t Households See the Light? 
Explaining the Diffusion of Compact Fluorescent Lamps  9 
provides limited information on the education of the highest income earner and 
only a discrete indicator of secondary school attainment is included in the specifi-
cation. The presence of children in the household may also shift household pref-
erences for CFLs, as may residence in a former East German Federal State.  
An indicator for households headed by senior officials, senior managers, or 
highly skilled professionals is also included in both the market entry and adop-
tion intensity equations. The potential influence of job type on the market entry 
decision is unclear a priori. On the one hand, senior managers and skilled pro-
fessional may be more proficient at acquiring information and calculating the 
cost-savings associated with new technologies. On the other hand, the higher 
opportunity cost of time of this group of workers may reduce their willingness to 
invest in information on new technologies. Adoption intensity may also be influ-
enced by job type if senior managers and skilled professional are better able to 
calculate the potential profitability of new innovations.  
Household income often has a major influence on the market entry decision. 
Assuming the concavity of the utility function decreases with income, the differ-
ential between expected net cost-savings from CFL adoption,    
,   
and the costs of information acquisition, c, that is necessary for market entry 
also declines with income (Arrow 1974; Coady 1993). Thus market entry be-
comes more likely at higher income levels, ceteris paribus. Low income levels 
may also raise credit constraints to market entry. However, the initial cost of 
CFL bulbs is relatively low compared to other residential energy-saving innova-
tions and such credit constraints may only be binding at very low income levels. 
Further, market entry may increase with income levels because the income e-
lasticity of willingness to pay for environmental benefits is positive (Kristrom and 
Riera 1996). Higher opportunity costs of time for individuals in higher income 
groups are, however, likely to temper the positive impact of household income 
on market entry. Decreasing risk aversion and higher opportunities costs of time 
with higher income are likely to have a smaller impact on the intensity of adop-
tion than on market entry, as information investments have already been made 
and the performance of the new technology is uncertain in the adoption intensity 
decision. In order to empirically capture non-linear income effects, indicators for 
the sixteen household monthly net income groups are included in the specifica-
tions of both the market entry and the adoption intensity equations.  
(* ) (* ) zb d F zb
−∞ ∫
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Prices are expected to influence both the aggregate and marginal cost-savings 
of CFLs relative the incandescent bulbs. Regional price data on CFLs is not 
available, but prices may not vary greatly across the Federal States of Ger-
many. Federal State specific average household electricity prices are, however, 
generated from the dataset based on household reported kWh consumption 
and electricity expenditures and are included in both the market entry and adop-
tion intensity specifications.6
Information constraints have often been cited as a significant barrier to adoption 
of CFLs (e.g. Sathaye and Murtishaw 2004). Several proxies for exposure to 
information on household energy use and CFL bulbs are included in the market 
entry equation specification as proxies for information constraints. Specifically, 
awareness of the potential of energy saving innovations is proxied for by an in-
dicator for household knowledge of the energy-class of their refrigerator or free-
zer under the EU labeling scheme. Similarly, household awareness of their en-
ergy use is measured by an indicator of household ability to provide information 
on annual residential electricity use. A measure of the share of households in 
the Federal State using CFLs is also included in the market entry equation 
specification as a blunt measure of regional information networks.7 Finally, po-
tential geographic differences in accessibility to CFLs is proxied by two indica-
tors for city size; residence in small towns with populations under 3,000 persons 
and residence in large cities with populations over one million. Large cities may 
have a greater array on retail outlets, making it easier for households to find and 
purchase CFLs (Sandahl et al. 2006). Large cities may also have been differen-
tially targeted by electrical utilities with information campaigns on energy-saving 
bulbs, given decreased transaction costs of such campaigns in high density ar-
eas (Sandahl et al. 2006). 
A key assumption underlying the double hurdle model is that some factors have 
different effects on household market entry and household adoption intensity 
decisions. Robust model identification also requires that some variables unique-
ly influence market entry and some variables uniquely influence adoption inten-
sity (Maddala 1983). In the current application the four proxies for exposure to 
information on CFLs and accessibility to CFLs (knowledge of refrigerator – free-
                                            
6  Calculations produced clearly infeasible prices for some households in the sample. Federal 
State average prices were, therefore, based on the average of households with calculated 
prices in the Euro 0.10 to Euro 0.20 per kWh range. 
7  The rate is calculated for each household based on the observed adoption of all other hou-
seholds in the same Federal State. Why Don’t Households See the Light? 
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zer energy class, reported electric bill, regional CFL adoption rate, and city size) 
are included in the market entry equation, but excluded from the adoption inten-
sity equation. Likewise, as discussed, the total number of light bulbs in the resi-
dence is specified to uniquely influence adoption intensity and is excluded from 
the market entry equation. 12  Why Don’t Households See the Light?  
Explaining the Diffusion of Compact Fluorescent Lamps 
3 Data 
The dataset comes from a written survey of private sector household energy 
consumption conducted in December of 2002 as part of a multi-topic survey of 
an existing representative panel of German households (Schlomann 2004). O-
verall, 20,235 households (75 percent) responded to the mailed questionnaire. 
Survey responses were generally of high quality and 17,828 respondents pro-
vided information on all the variables used in this study and were retained in the 
current sample.  
Approximately two-thirds of the households in the sample reported some use of 
CFLs, suggesting widespread exposure to CFL technologies and a high level of 
market entry (table 1). However, the overall intensity of adoption is rather low, 
with the average household reporting 16.9 percent all household bulbs being 
CFLs. Even among households reporting some use of CFLs the overall intensity 
of adoption is limited, with CFLs representing 25.5 percent of all bulbs. Given 
the longer life for CFLs compared to incandescent bulbs, these estimates are 
consistent with a slightly more recent estimate of a 6 percent share for CFLs in 
the European market (Sathaye and Murtishaw 2004). A kernel estimate of the 
probability density function for adoption intensity of households with some CFL 
use is presented in figure 2. The estimated distribution clearly suggests censor-
ing at the lower limit of adoption intensity, supporting use of a Tobit estimator. 
On the other hand, there is little evidence of censoring at upper 100 percent 
limit of adoption intensity, with only 0.8 percent of sample households reporting 
100 percent CFL adoption. Thus, the descriptive data supports an important 
necessary condition for the total number of light sockets to have no impact on 
the market entry decision - that few households expect to have 100 percent a-
doption intensity. In fact, the highest concentration of probability in the adoption 
intensity density is in the 0 to 20 percent range, with the median household a-
doption intensity being 9.1 percent. Descriptive statistics for model covariates 
are also provided in table 1. Why Don’t Households See the Light? 
Explaining the Diffusion of Compact Fluorescent Lamps  13 
Figure 2:   Kernel density estimate for households with positive adoption 
intensity 
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Table 1:  Descriptive statistics (n=17,828) 
Variable Description Mean St. Dev. Min. Max.
Use of any energy-saving bulbs some use = 1 0.6626 0 1
Ratio energy-saving to all bulbs 0.1688 0.213 0 1
Total number of bulbs 26.5343 19.150 2 705
Residence size meters2 99.3236 43.226 11 490
Detached home yes = 1 0.3609 0 1
Rent residence yes = 1 0.4579 0 1
Residence older than 1951 yes = 1 0.2619 0 1
Retiree yes = 1 0.3192 0 1
Number of persons truncated at 5 persons 2.3110 1.097 1 5
Age of main income earner 51.6523 15.065 16 95
Children in household under 6 years = 1 0.0932 0 1
East Germany yes = 1 0.2064 0 1
Higher education secondary school main inc. earner, yes=1 0.7192 0 1
Management position sen. official, exec. or skilled profess. =1 0.1042 0 1
Income class monthly net income (Euro)
   Class 1 0 - 499 0.0094 0 1
   Class 2 500 - 749 0.0247 0 1
   Class 3 750 - 999 0.0402 0 1
   Class 4 1,000 - 1,249 0.0717 0 1
   Class 5 1,250 - 1,499 0.0967 0 1
   Class 6 1,500 - 1,749 0.0960 0 1
   Class 7 1,750 - 1,999 0.0882 0 1
   Class 8 2,000 - 2,249 0.1070 0 1
   Class 9 2,250 - 2,499 0.0923 0 1
   Class 10 2,500 - 2,749 0.0797 0 1
   Class 11 2,750 - 2,999 0.0581 0 1
   Class 12 3,000 - 3,249 0.0638 0 1
   Class 13 3,250 - 3,499 0.0412 0 1
   Class 14 3,500 - 3,749 0.0269 0 1
   Class 15 3,750 - 4,000 0.0235 0 1
   Class 16 4,000+ 0.0805 0 1
Regional power price Ave. elect. price in Federal State (kWh) 0.1564 0.005 0.151 0.171
Regional rate of adoption Federal region, excluding own household 0.5955 0.031 0.556 0.668
Village local population <3,000 = 1 0.0849 0 1
City local population > 1,000,000 = 1 0.0892 0 1
Report annual electric bill yes = 1 0.7015 0 1
Know fridge-freezer energy class yes = 1 0.2197 0 1 Why Don’t Households See the Light? 
Explaining the Diffusion of Compact Fluorescent Lamps  15 
4  Results and Discussion 
The Double Hurdle model is initially estimated allowing for correlation between 
the market entry and the adoption intensity error terms. However, a 
2 χ  test 
(0.164 with d.f.=1) fails to support rejection of independence of error terms.8 
Further, the parameter estimates in the Double Hurdle model with dependent 
error terms (available from the authors upon request) are virtually identical to 
those in the independent error term model. Thus, the independent error term 
estimation results are presented in table 2 and are the focus of the ensuing dis-
cussion. 
Focusing first on the market entry equation results, the parameter estimate for 
the linear floor size term is negative but not statistically significant.9 However, 
the parameter estimate for the quadratic term for floor size is positive and sig-
nificant at the p=0.05 level. Combined, the parameter estimates imply that the 
probability of CFL market entry increases with residence floor size across the 
relevant range of floor space sizes found in the dataset. Further, the effect ap-
pears to be stronger at higher levels of floor space. Thus, greater lighting needs 
that are entailed in larger households appear to generate strong incentives to 
overcome information and accessibility barriers to CFL market entry. The indi-
cator for detached housing has a significant positive parameter estimate, which 
implies that market entry is more likely for residents in detached housing than 
for residents in other housing types. However renting rather than owning and 
pre-1951 age of residence do not significantly influence market entry.  
                                            
8  Note the point estimate for the error correlation coefficient ρ is close to zero (0.033), but the 
standard error on the estimate is quite large. Problems with the precision of error correlation 
coefficient estimates in the Double-Hurdle model have been previously noted by Smith 
(2002). 
9  Floor size and residence size are divided by 100 to allow reporting of the parameter esti-
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Table 2:  Double hurdle model estimates (n=17,828) 
Coefficient Std. Err. Coefficient Std. Err.
Total number of bulbs/100 -0.6451 0.0328 **
Total number of bulbs/100 sq. 0.3335 0.0271 **
Residence size/100 -0.3950 0.6021 -0.0154 0.0253
Residence size/100 sq. 1.0368 0.4072 ** 0.0141 0.0072 **
Detached home 0.2404 0.1101 ** 0.0181 0.0067 **
Rent residence -0.1081 0.0793 0.0091 0.0073
Residence older than 1951 -0.0324 0.0631 0.0110 0.0059 *
Retiree 0.1634 0.0869 * 0.0221 0.0086 **
Number of persons 0.1765 0.0539 ** 0.0117 0.0033 **
Age of main income earner 0.0039 0.0129 0.0112 0.0014 **
Age of main income earner sq. 0.00001 0.00012 -0.00009 0.00001 **
Children in household 0.1068 0.0637 * -0.0058 0.0062
East Germany -0.1107 0.1753 -0.0172 0.0101 *
Higher education 0.1918 0.1600 0.0070 0.0113
Management position -0.2404 0.1284 * 0.0056 0.0090
Income class
   Class 1  (€0 - €499) -0.5846 0.1889 ** 0.1388 0.0374 **
   Class 2 (€500 - €749) -0.2405 0.1608 0.0402 0.0219 *
   Class 3 (€750 - €999) 0.0747 0.1611 0.0240 0.0172
   Class 4 (€1,000 - €1,249) -0.1915 0.1297 0.0342 0.0134 **
   Class 5 (€1,250 - €1,499) -0.2203 0.1254 * 0.0136 0.0123
   Class 6 (€1,500 - €1,749) -0.2118 0.1279 * 0.0163 0.0119
   Class 7 (€1,750 - €1,999) 0.0553 0.1493 -0.0128 0.0117
   Class 8 (€2,000 - €2,249) -0.0075 0.1545 -0.0021 0.0115
   Class 9 (€2,250 - €2,499) -0.0132 0.1634 -0.0003 0.0118
   Class 10 (€2,500 - €2,749) 0.2252 0.2234 -0.0303 0.0128 **
   Class 11 (€2,750 - €2,999) 0.2301 0.2232 -0.0085 0.0123
   Class 12 (€3,000 - €3,249) 0.3943 0.3168 -0.0089 0.0141
   Class 13 (€3,250 - €3,499) 0.3322 0.3455 0.0005 0.0160
   Class 14 (€3,500 - €3,749) 0.1057 0.4247 -0.0386 0.0180 **
   Class 15 (€3,750 - €4,000) 0.1225 0.2402 -0.0195 0.0122
   Class 16 (€4,000+) 21.2650 12.2432 * 0.7134 0.8745
Regional rate of adoption 0.2293 1.3386
Village -0.0890 0.1159
City 0.0120 0.1239
Report annual electric bill 0.1529 0.0535 **
Know fridge - freezer energy class 0.6654 0.1112 **
Constant -3.5358 1.9666 * -0.1896 0.1455
Sigma 0.2598 0.0040 **
Log-likelihood -6563.85
Note:  * indicates significance in two-tailed t-test at p=0.10 level,
 ** indicates significance in two-tailed t-test at p=0.05 level.
Market Entry Adoption intensity
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Several household member characteristics that influence household lighting 
needs also appear to generate incentives for market entry. Specifically, the pro-
bability of market entry increases with the number of persons in the residence 
and, weakly, with the presence of children under 6 years of age (p=0.10). The 
parameter estimate for households headed by retirees is also positive and 
weakly significant (p=0.10).  
The probability of market entry appears to be lower for households where the 
head has a senior management position or is a skilled professional (p=0.10). 
Thus, the socio-economic elite do not appear to have greater propensities to 
overcome information barriers to CFL adoption. This finding is also supported 
by the income group parameter estimates. With the median income group 
(class 8) as the default for comparison, only the lowest income group (class 1) 
shows a significantly lower propensities to enter the CFL market at the p=0.05 
level. Two other lower income groups (class 5 and class 6) show weaker nega-
tive associations with market entrance (p=0.10). On the other hand, none of the 
higher income groups are estimated to have a significantly different propensity 
from the median income group to enter the CFL bulb market. The result sug-
gests that income constraints to market entry are strong only at very low income 
levels. Cost factors also appear to influence market entry, as the probability of 
market entry increases with regional energy prices. 
Proxies for regional information networks in the form of Federal State adoption 
rates and regional accessibility in the form of town size indicators are not sig-
nificant. However, parameter estimates for indicators for household awareness 
of their residential energy situation (in the form of knowledge of the energy rat-
ing of the refrigerator or freezer and knowledge of household annual electrical 
consumption) are positive. Thus, awareness of energy use appears to be an 
important factor in the market entry decision. 
Estimated relationships in the adoption intensity equation are in many cases 
very different from those found in the market entry equation. The parameter es-
timate on the linear term for total number of bulbs in the household is negative, 
while the estimate on the quadratic term is positive in the adoption intensity 
equation. The combined effect of the parameters on the intensity of CFL adop-
tion is negative for the range of the number of bulbs found in the vast majority of 
households (up to 194 total bulbs in the residence). Further, the absolute value 
of the negative effect of total number of bulbs on adoption intensity increases up 
to 97 bulbs, which includes over 99 percent of households in the sample. Thus, 
as expected, adoption intensity is lower in households with a relatively high 18  Why Don’t Households See the Light?  
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number of sockets after controlling for floor area and lighting needs. Residence 
size also influences adoption intensity by raising lighting needs, particularly after 
controlling for the total number of bulbs in the household. The linear term for 
residence size is not significant, while the quadratic term is positive and signifi-
cant. Combined, the effect of residence size on adoption intensity is positive 
and increasing for residences with floor areas greater than 54m
2 (89.6 percent 
of the sample). 
Adoption intensity is found to be significantly higher in detached homes and, 
somewhat surprisingly, in homes built prior to 1951. The latter effect is, how-
ever, only significant at the p=0.10 level. When combined with the insignificant 
effect of pre-1951 housing on market entry, the result suggests that the fixed 
housing stock is not a major constraint to the diffusion of CFLs. The finding is 
also consistent with the fact that modern CFLs were available for virtually every 
type of socket and size of lighting fixture (Sandahl et al., 2006). The fact that, in 
contrast to the findings for other residential energy-saving innovations, tenancy 
does not influence either market entry or the intensity of adoption may be in part 
due to the possibility for renters to take CFLs with them when moving.  
For household characteristics, adoption intensity is higher among retirees and 
increases with the number of members of the household. As with residence si-
ze, these estimates are consistent with a positive association between adoption 
intensity and lighting needs. In the quadratic specification for the age of the 
main income earner, the parameter estimate for the linear term is positive and 
the estimate for the quadratic term is negative. Combined, the parameter esti-
mates suggest that age has a positive, but declining, impact on adoption inten-
sity up to 62 years, and then a negative impact. Unlike for market entry, the 
presence of children in the household has no impact on adoption intensity. Ho-
wever, residence in a former East German Federal State is weakly associated 
with lower adoption intensity. The impact of income on adoption intensity is also 
notably different than the impact on market entry. Compared to the median in-
come group (class 8), adoption intensity is higher for some of the lower income 
groups; class 1 and class 4 at the p=0.05 level and class 2 at the p=0.10 level. 
By contrast, the parameter estimates for all income groups above class 8 are 
negative, with the estimates for class 11 and class 15 being statistically signifi-
cant. The results imply that lower income groups tend to adopt more intensively 
than higher income groups. This effect may stem from greater utility gains from 
the monetary value of cost-savings associated with CFL investments due to 
higher marginal utilities of income in low income households. Finally, regional 
power prices do not significantly influence adoption intensity. Thus, while high Why Don’t Households See the Light? 
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regional power prices spur CFL market entry, they do not generate significant 
incentives to increase adoption intensity.  
Two alternative specifications of the model are also estimated in order to ex-
plore the robustness of the results to exclusion restrictions. In the first alterna-
tive addresses the concern that the number of bulbs in the residence may influ-
ence market entry. Specifically, the market entry exclusion restriction is dropped 
and the total number of bulbs variable is included in the market entry equation. 
Thus, identification of the market entry equation is, in this case, based on the 
non-linearity of the estimator. The results do not support concerns about the 
validity of the exclusion restriction, as the total number of bulbs is not significant 
in the market entry equation and other parameter estimates are similar in mag-
nitude and significance.10 The second alternative specification drops the re-
gional share of other households adopting CFL bulbs from the market entry 
equation. Again, the results are virtually unchanged from the initial estimate. Of 
particular note, the regional power price parameter point estimates are almost 
identical, alleviating concerns that limited, and possibly highly correlated, varia-
tion in regional power price and regional adoption rate variables might mask the 
impact of power prices on CFL uptake.  
Income group simulations 
Figure 3 presents the estimated probability of CFL market entry for each sample 
income group after controlling for other characteristics of the household. Spe-
cifically, the following variables are set to their average for the whole sample: 
number of bulbs in the household, detached household, renting, pre-1951 age 
of residence, floor area, number of persons in the household, age of main in-
come earner, regional power prices, adoption rate in region, knowledge of an-
nual electricity bill, and knowledge of refrigerator – freezer energy rating. At the 
same time, the following indicators are set to zero in light of their relatively low 
frequency across all income groups: retiree, presence of children under 6 in 
household, residence in East Germany, senior manager or highly skilled profes-
sional head, residence in village under 3,000 persons, and residence in city with 
more than one million persons. Similarly, the indicator for secondary school e-
ducation of the head is set to one, since most household heads have at least 
this level of education in all income groups. The simulation results, depicted by 
the diamond-ticked line, indicate that the probability of market entry generally 
                                            
10   A table of results is available from the authors upon request. 20  Why Don’t Households See the Light?  
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increases across income groups. However, the probability is quite high for all 
groups; ranging from 88 percent for the lowest income group (one) to 97 per-
cent for the highest income group (sixteen).  
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As household income is highly correlated with characteristics of the residence, a 
second simulation is conducted where the number of bulbs and the floor space 
of the residence are set as income-group-specific averages, as are the frequen-
cies associated with indicators for detached, pre-1951, and rented residences. 
The results, depicted by the triangle-ticked line, indicate that these bundles of 
residence characteristics within income groups have a much stronger impact on 
market entry than income alone; as the probability of market entry now ranges 
from 68 percent for the lowest income group to virtual certainty in the highest 
income groups. Thus barriers to CFL market entry among low income groups 
appear to stem more from residence characteristics associated with income 
levels than from income levels themselves. 
Low income households also have less knowledge about their level of electricity 
consumption (as measure by ability to provide information of annual electricity 
consumption and energy class of refrigerator or freezer). Two simulations are Why Don’t Households See the Light? 
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conducted to assess the potential impact of these energy consumption informa-
tion constraints on CFL market entry. First, information constraints are set to 
income group specific averages in the square-ticked line. The results show that 
relatively low levels of information on electricity consumption prevalent in lower 
income households only slightly decrease the probability of market entry (e.g. 
the probability of entry drops from 68 percent to 63 percent for the lowest in-
come group). The second simulation examines the, somewhat unrealistic, impli-
cations of providing all households with complete information on household en-
ergy consumption by setting indicators of knowledge of household annual en-
ergy consumption and knowledge of refrigerator-freezer energy class to one for 
all income groups in the x-ticked line. As the lowest income groups start with the 
lowest level of knowledge, the simulation has the greatest impact on the group’s 
probability of market entry and essentially offsets the negative influence of the 
residence characteristics of low income households on market entry. By con-
trast, the impact of knowledge constraints on market entry for households with 
income above the median is rather small due to very high initial probabilities of 
market entry. 
Figure 4 depicts the impacts of income and associated residence characteristics 
on adoption intensity. The diamond-ticked line estimates adoption intensity by 
income group with other characteristics again held constant. Adoption intensity 
declines rapidly across income groups from 28 percent for group one to 12 per-
cent for group sixteen. Further, allowing the characteristics of the residence to 
take income-group-specific averages (square-ticked line) intensifies this decline. 
It is important to note, however, that the average total number of bulbs in the 
household increases almost four-fold from the lowest to the highest income 
group. As a result, the share decline in adoption intensity associated with in-
come and income related residence characteristics translates into a relatively 
constant expected number of CFLs per household of between three and four in 
every income group.  22  Why Don’t Households See the Light?  
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5  Conclusions and Policy Implications 
As might be expected, given that CFLs have been widely available for some 
time, barriers to market entry are low for all households except those with net 
incomes below 750 Euros per month. Further, barriers to market entry appear to 
arise as much from the characteristics of the residences of low income house-
holds, like small residence size and infrequent detached housing, as from in-
come levels themselves. Untargeted campaigns to address market barriers to 
entry will, therefore, have little widespread impact on CFL diffusion. There is, 
however, some room to specifically address knowledge barriers to market entry 
among low income households. Such targeting might best be done in conjunc-
tion with means-tested housing programs (e.g. rent subsidies and provision of 
low-income housing).  
Given low barriers to market entry, efforts to substantially increase CFL diffu-
sion will need to focus on increasing the intensity of household adoption. Sur-
prisingly, adoption intensity varies inversely with household income. But given 
that the number household sockets increases rapidly with income, the average 
number of CFLs per household remains relatively constant in the range of three 
to four for all household income groups. This implies that the number of lighting 
sockets for which households perceive CFL investments to be warranted is rela-
tively fixed in absolute value across socio-economic groups. At the same time, 
CFL adoption intensity does appear to be responsive to a number of indicators 
of lighting needs. However raising lighting needs in order to promote diffusion is 
clearly counter-productive to the objective of lowering residential energy con-
sumption and reducing greenhouse gas emissions.  
The responsiveness of adoption intensity to energy prices also appears to be 
low, suggesting that increasing taxes on electricity use will have little impact on 
the overall diffusion of CFLs. Although it is worth reiterating that price response 
is based on calculated average regional power prices that do not completely 
reflect prices paid by individual households. Bans on incandescent bulb sales 
are the most direct policy to increase diffusion. But bans would be costly for 
households, as even with relatively widespread exposure to CFLs most house-
holds choose to invest in only a limited number of applications. Such bans 
would not, however, have a strong disproportionate impact on low income hou-
seholds, as lower income households are already proportionately intense CFL 
adopters especially in light of their relatively low lighting needs.  24  Why Don’t Households See the Light?  
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Continuing technological innovation to further increase performance and lower 
initial costs, some of which has occurred since the 2002 survey, can extend the 
number of lighting applications for which CFLs are perceived as profitable hou-
sehold investments and promote further diffusion. Despite impressive technical 
specifications, for some CFLs a substantial gap may exist between engineering 
data and residential performance. Subsidies may be needed to focus research 
innovation on closing this gap in order to speed diffusion and lower the costs to 
households of any imposed restrictions of the sale of incandescent bulbs. 
Areas for further research are strongly linked to the need for improved house-
hold data. Specifically, panel data on household uptake of CFLs and changes in 
CFL prices and power prices would significantly improve estimates of re-
sponses to economic incentives. Household panel data would also provide the 
opportunity to better control for time-invariant unobserved household heteroge-
neity, particularly with respect to attitudes towards the environment that may be 
associated with current measures of knowledge of household electricity bills 
and refrigerator energy class. Why Don’t Households See the Light? 
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